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Abstract  
 
The European social and welfare models are questioned in the context of the 
internationalization of the economy. The situation is quite different in the US where the 
combination of a rapid economic growth, full employment and a usually less developed 
welfare state seem to alleviate economic and social burden of internationalization. A 
comparative study of the primary distribution of economic revenue between individual’s 
wages, recruitment of new salaries and profits show a convergence between Europe and the 
US since the eighties. Meanwhile, the design of welfare state continues to oppose the 
continental euro-model to the US model. Scandinavian and British models maintain also 
there specificities. But ageing will challenge welfare state in every occidental countries. As a 
matter of fact it implies an increase of social spending everywhere. So if structural differences 
are likely to remain between social and welfare models in Europe and with the US one, the 
regression of public social spending could be stop and a new development of welfare state 
could appears essential to the equilibrium between market economy exigencies and social 
needs. 
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Welfare lies at the heart of the European political debate, while the French and the Dutch 
rejection of the European constitution project in the spring of 2005 can largely be explained 
by the worries stirred by the return of the primacy of economics over the social aims of public 
intervention. It was because the constitution project gave too much precedence to the 
demands of “competition” and the “free circulation of goods and services” that eventually, 
and especially in France, a majority of citizens preferred to halt―at least momentarily―the 
political construction of Europe rather than question the “European social model.” In the 
political debate, the social model referred to is only rarely defined with precision: it 
encapsulates implicitly all the dispositions which protect the workers’ status on the labour 
market and the compulsory collective insurance systems which fund unemployment benefits, 
pensions, healthcare expenditures and allowances for the disabled. It is generally admitted 
that in Europe the judicial system of workers’ protection and the system of public insurance, 
which consist in welfare protection against the basic risks of existence (old age, illness, 
handicap, unemployment), are more widespread than anywhere else in the world. It is claimed 
that such an extension of European welfare leads to rigidities and, ultimately, to extra costs 
which impair economic productivity and account for the slow pace of economic growth. With 
respect to less developed countries, such as China, India or Brazil, differences in welfare 
cannot provide a serious explanation, while differences in wage expenditures result directly 
from the gaps in lifestyles and are widely compensated for by differences in productivity 
which mostly restrain competition to low-quality products. However, the explanation may 
have some credibility when it comes to comparing the American and European situations. 
 
In order to assess the relevance of these reasonings, the reality of the opposition between the 
European and the American welfare models should be tested. 
 
A lot of data is available, but interpreting it is delicate. In particular, the impact of the 
different judicial dispositions is very difficult to evaluate. It is true that, at first sight, 
American―or more generally Anglo-Saxon―labour laws seem less constricting than the 
labour laws of continental Europe. But anti-discrimination and equal opportunity laws impose 
constraints with respect to both hiring and dismissal procedures which are such that the 
judicial pressure over employment may actually prove to be as high in America as it is in 
Europe.  
 
Moreover, the direct comparison of labour costs does not highlight a lasting gap in 
competitivity between the American economy and the European economy. The external 
bilateral trade between Europe and the United States remains very favourable to Europe. The 
competition between the welfare models appears to have very little direct effect over the 
commercial competition between the European and American economic areas, and so far the 
international financial system has made it possible to transfer global financial surpluses 
towards the deficient United States without any particular strain.  
 
The stakes of the debates over welfare models thus appear to revolve primarily on the internal 
consequences of these models. What is under discussion bears upon the social consequences 
of the national systems: is well-being higher in liberal countries, in America or in Europe? 
 
Welfare systems were all designed to stabilise the individuals’ incomes over their lifetimes, so 
as to prevent situations of absolute poverty from arising, and to contribute to stabilising the 
economy by limiting the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations. The methods used to achieve 
such aims are very variable and the systems have numerous idiosyncrasies which make any 
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comparison difficult. Moreover, the economic situations and the primary distribution of the 
growth returns also differ in each country and period. Of course, this is not without 
consequences for the welfare systems, which have to face different and changing challenges.  
 
The macro-social context and its evolution in Europe and the United States from 1970 to the 
present day will be introduced in turn (§1). Then, the traditional typology of the welfare 
systems founded on institutional comparisons. This typology is relatively robust, since 
observing the structural repartition of welfare expenditures roughly confirms institutional 
remarks (§3). It will then be seen that the efficiency of welfare systems from the viewpoint of 
the fight against poverty still depends heavily on public spending levels (§ 4). Finally, the 
shared challenges which the welfare systems will have to overcome over the next years, and 
which mainly derive from the ageing of the population will be introduced last (§5). The crisis 
of the welfare state is now a common theme and in this perspective it will be shown that the 
crisis affects private insurance systems just as much, and that an extra effort to redistribute 
incomes will prove indispensable in the future on both the Western and the Eastern shores of 
the Atlantic. 
 
 
1. Primary income sharing between wages, employment and profits: from the 
strong opposition between Europe and the United States in the seventies to 
convergence in the nineties. 
 
In order to analyse the modalities in primary income sharing, it is convenient to decompose 
the added value’s evolution according to whether it can be put down to a rise in employment, 
individual wages, or profits. Added value can indeed be decomposed according to the 
following equation, in which AV stands for the added value, w for the average individual 
wage level, E for employment, P for the companies’ profits, and Taxes, for indirect taxes. 
 
(1) AV = w* E + P + Taxes 
 
The added value’s variation can then be decomposed according to whether it is associated 
with the individual wages’ variation (1st term of equation 2), to employment variation (2nd 
term), to the combination of the variations of individual wages and employment (3rd term), to 
the variation of profits (4th term) and tax variation (5th term). 
(2) * * *1 w E w E w E P Taxes
AV AV AV AV AV
Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ= + + + +Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ  
 
The following figures (1 to 3) retrace the evolution of the added value’s growth sharing from 
the seventies to the nineties, between individual wages, employment and profits.1  
 
In the seventies, the United States and Europe were clearly opposed with respect to primary 
distribution of wealth creations (figure 1). In the United States, work productivity was slow to 
evolve and individual wages did not increase by much. A very important part of wealth 
increase was thus affected to job creations. Also, the share attributed to profits was relatively 
high. 
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Figure 1: Distribution in the seventies: the strong opposition between the United States 
and Europe 
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On the contrary, in Europe, in the four largest countries, the largest part of income growth was 
used to improve individual wages, while the share attributed to employment was very weak 
and that of profit slightly less important than in the United States. Sweden presented slightly 
different characteristics, with a primary income sharing more propitious to employment than 
in the other European countries. Figure 1 highlights the very strong polarisation of the 
European and the American models in the seventies. Such a configuration of income growth 
sharing can be given a simple explanation, which rests on the gap in development between 
Europe and the United States. At the end of the war and up to the late seventies, the United 
States was far ahead of Europe. Individual wages were much higher there. However, because 
it was at the cutting edge of technological development, and these years did not see any 
technical upheaval, the increase of work productivity was relatively low. In the same period, 
Europe was in a very different situation; it had to catch up on its technological backwardness. 
Most of its employment growth resulted mainly from production increase, while a very sharp 
increase in work productivity made it possible for the individual wages’ purchasing power to 
gradually meet that of the United States. Moreover, a very steep increase in production 
ensured a sufficient progression in profits despite the weaker growth share attributed to it. 
 
The opposition between the American and the European growth models gradually disappeared 
from the eighties onwards (figure 2). In France and Germany at first, the evolutions following 
the oil crises did indeed lead to a major slowing down of individual wages, which saw their 
economic growth share brought down to the level of what could be seen in the United States. 
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Figure 2: Distribution in the eighties: France and Germany align themselves on the 
United States 
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This change was accompanied by the attribution to companies’ profits of most of the growth 
returns. In Germany, employment saw its contribution rise and the distribution scheme 
became almost identical with that of the United States, whereas in France job creations 
remained weak. In the United States, in Italy, the United Kingdom, and in Sweden, the 
primary income distribution pattern went through fewer changes than in the previous period. 
These stylised facts were characteristic of a period of structural adjustment in Europe within 
the countries which had previously experienced a very high growth, which had made it 
possible to catch up on American productivity and provided for a strong wage increase. But 
the mid-seventies and early-eighties oil crises had caused strong macroeconomic imbalances 
there because the wage increase had been going on and profits had been strangled by the 
rising energy costs. To some extent, the decrease of the wages’ share and the increase of the 
profits’ share in the distribution of growth returns therefore resulted from a delayed adaptation 
to the crises’ consequences over energy-related production costs. In this respect the evolutions 
witnessed in Italy, the United Kingdom and Sweden only resulted from a longer adaptation 
lag. But, in addition to the necessity of adapting to the changing energy costs, the 
modification of the European distribution pattern and its increasing similarity with the 
American model corresponded to a deeper maturation trend of the European economy which 
was completing its phase of catching up with the American development level in the late 
eighties. The European economy’s newfound maturity thus translated into a lasting slowing 
down of the work productivity growth which, through the threat of a widening of 
macroeconomic imbalances, forbade a quick increase of work returns from then on – all the 
more as the rise of unemployment made for a sharing of growth returns which was more 
favourable to job creations. 
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During the nineties and in the early two thousands, distribution patterns in Europe and the 
United States became very close while the Scandinavian model appeared increasingly 
autonomous. 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution in the nineties; the large European countries and the United 
States eventually converge, Sweden takes another direction 
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The macroeconomic adjustments being over in Europe, the single distribution pattern then 
became a very balanced sharing of the growth returns between individual wages, jobs, and 
profits. The share devoted to wages was slightly higher in the United Kingdom and the share 
affected to profits was slightly higher in Italy (where the adjustment had taken place later) and 
in Germany (the reunification implied a high level of investment and of productive capital 
accumulation), but there was an almost perfect superposition between the triangles of the 
European countries and that of the United States. On the contrary, in Sweden, the share 
corresponding to job creations became negative and that affected to individual wages became 
very prominent. This evolution resulted from the adaptation of the Swedish job market 
through the lowering of workforce activity. The early nineties’ macroeconomic shock was 
very important in Scandinavia and led to strong employment cuts which could not be made up 
for in the early two thousands despite the increased competitivity made possible, in Sweden, 
by an important and lasting monetary devaluation. In order to cut unemployment the only 
solution then consisted in lowering the working population, which was provided for by social 
policies excluding the ‘disabled’ from the job market. These policies also made it possible to 
bring unemployment back to a low level, but they also contributed to the rise of social 
contributions. The originality of the Scandinavian model stands out clearly: in the event of 
macroeconomic difficulties, the size of the countries involved makes it possible to look for a 
solution through the increase of competitivity founded on currency adaptation and important 
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rises in productivity. These allow for a wage increase, but important takings must be operated 
in order to fund high benefits meant for those excluded from the labour market.  
 
The evolutions and changes in these primary distribution patterns have influenced social 
evolutions, the need for benefits and the conditions of its funding. 
 
The primary sharing of the economic growth returns influences social evolutions through its 
impact on employment, unemployment and the evolution of incomes. When the economy and 
work productivity rise quickly, full employment is another consequence, since many jobs are 
created due to the growth, as well as a quick income increase, since productivity gains make it 
possible to fund wage increases without inflation and without evicting profits. This situation, 
which was characteristic of Europe up to the seventies, is conducive to social progress in all 
its aspects: increase of individual purchasing power, reduction of working hours, possible 
lowering of the retirement age, etc. However, when economy has joined a weaker long-term 
growth path, full employment can only rest on a strict sharing of wealth creation, which limits 
individual earnings and reserves an important part to job creations. Subsequently, even if the 
level of wages and individual purchasing power are high, their growth can only be limited. 
Similarly, there is little leeway to improve work conditions or distribute extra social benefits. 
The prolongation for a relatively long time of the sharing pattern inherited from the high 
growth, while economy had slowed down its progress because of the end of the catching up 
phase, accounts for the rise and then the maintaining of high level of unemployment in 
Europe, whose absorption was not finished yet. The lack of an efficient accompaniment to 
structural changes through relevant economic policies also explains the European difficulties. 
Restrictive policies were justified during the sharing pattern’s first phase of adaptation to the 
slower rhythm of work productivity. Since the beginning of the nineties’ the macroeconomic 
imbalances are absorbed, as shown by the disappearance of inflation, and the profit level is 
now compatible again with the funding needs of capital accumulation in the long term.  
 
Over the same period, the United States encountered far lesser difficulties, since it only had to 
overcome the effects of the oil crises, without having to profoundly modify its income sharing 
pattern. The transitory nature of macroeconomic difficulties can also be explained by a much 
better adaptation of economic policy, which was traditionally used more massively and more 
quickly in the event of a rise of unemployment.  
 
The consequences of overall economic evolutions and of the primary income sharing over 
welfare were important. In the United States, the emphasis laid on full employment made it 
possible to limit the need for unemployment benefits while the wages-profits sharing 
remained stable. On the contrary, the existence of an important work pool has made it 
possible to implement social policies geared towards welfare-to-workfare initiatives and 
income support for the most disadvantaged (through the earning income tax credit). However, 
in the European countries where unemployment rose the most as a result of the 
macroeconomic maladjustments amplified by inappropriate responses, economic policies 
were forced to increase their income support spending for the unemployed and people 
involuntarily driven out of work.  
 
 
2. Institutional typology of the welfare systems 
 
The art of classification and typology relies on a reduction of the complexity of reality which 
evidences the distinctive features of “opposite” models. In terms of welfare there is a 
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traditional opposition between “Bismarckian” countries, in which insurance against the major 
social risks (illness, unemployment, old age) is organised within the job sectors or activity 
branches and financed by contributions taken from wages, and, on the other hand, 
Beveridgian models in which social protection comes from the state. 
 
In Bismarckian systems, the guarantees given by social protection are delivered to the 
workers and their families, whereas those who live outside the world of labour are excluded a 
priori and must either ensure personally that they have sufficient incomes, or fall back on the 
poor relief organisations generally granted by local authorities and financed by taxes. 
 
In Beveridgian systems, the state guarantees to the resident population income minima in case 
of unemployment, illness and during retirement. It also generally provides free healthcare.  
 
Since Esping-Andersen,2 these two basic models have usually been opposed to a 
Scandinavian model characterised by high levels of contributions and redistribution and by 
substantial state intervention. In this model, citizens have acquired rights, just as in the 
Beveridgian model, but they are far more important and they go far beyond the mere a 
minimum protection against social risks.  
 
These three basic Welfare State models are coupled with economic organisation regimes 
which are also different, so that, in the end, three broad social and economic models are 
defined: 
 
The “liberal” model, which combines greater economic freedom (few regulations on the 
goods and services markets, few public companies, reduced State intervention), with a 
minimal welfare state of Beveridgian inspiration. 
 
The so-called “conservative” or sometimes “corporatist” model, in which the State plays a 
much greater part, and economic regulations are stronger (especially in the sphere of labour 
legislation) and the welfare state derives from Bismarckian inspiration. 
 
The Northern European countries’ “social-democratic” model, in which the state plays an 
important―but different―role. Indeed, it is geared towards redistributing incomes and 
securing high social guarantees (especially in the event of unemployment) rather than market 
regulation. 
 
This typology is helpful to understand what national debates about welfare revolve around. A 
liberal-leaning country will debate above all the realm of application and the limits of welfare. 
Indeed, in such a system, the central questions hinge above all on determining the income 
level below which some intervention and state help are required, and the situations which 
must be covered by social intervention (unemployment type, family situation…). In a country 
with a conservative tradition, the debate will naturally be more about judicial regulations and 
their simultaneous impact on the economy and workers’ security. The question of the 
connection between welfare and employment costs will also be more emphasised because of 
the high level of social contributions. In social-democratic countries, the question of the cost 
of welfare and of its potential questioning by the opening up of national economies and 
globalisation will logically fuel debates, as will the impact of benefits and contributions over 
economic behaviours. 
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As all typologies, Esping-Andersen’s has the inconvenient of simplifying reality. On at least 
one point, it must be added on to cover roughly all the systems which may be encountered in 
developed western countries. In the south of Europe, indeed, there are systems which often 
have a mixed inspiration, but are less developed than the northern countries’. These Euro-
Mediterranean systems are applicable to societies in which families often provide private 
welfare for their members, thus making the existence of a public system less necessary. There 
is no doubt that this is an original system which has its place within a more thorough typology 
of welfare system. 
 
Lastly, four broad models can be considered to structure the European and American welfare 
states (table 1). 
 
Their geography unambiguously evidences the fact that this opposition between Europe and 
the United States is not so clear-cut. Indeed, Great-Britain is spontaneously listed with the 
United States in the liberal type. On the contrary, continental Europe appears to be divided 
into three, between the “conservative”, “social-democratic” and “Mediterranean” countries. 
The analysis developed here leaves aside the central European countries which have recently 
joined the European Community. Taking them into account would probably make the 
European map of welfare states even more complex. Therefore, this is very far from the 
opposition between some American model on the one hand and some European model on the 
other, and the institutional viewpoint evidences above all Europe’s heterogeneity. 
 
 
Table 1. Welfare systems in Europe and the United States 
 
 Liberal or 
residual 
Social-democratic Conservative or 
Corporatist 
Mediterranean or 
Familialist  
Geographic  
situation 
United 
States, 
United 
Kingdom, 
Ireland 
Scandinavia, 
Netherlands 
Continental 
Europe 
(Austria, 
Germany, 
France, 
Belgium) 
Southern Europe 
(Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece) 
Historical 
reference 
Beveridge Beveridge Bismarck Mixed. Often 
Beveridge since the 
reforms of the 1980s. 
Targets Fight 
against 
poverty 
Ensuring an 
income for 
everyone, 
egalitarian 
redistribution 
Keeping up the 
workers’ income
Vary according to the 
systems. Fight against 
poverty, but also 
keeping up incomes. 
Level of 
social 
expenditures 
average high high low 
Functioning 
principle 
selectivity universality contributivity Selectivity/ 
contributivity 
Technique 
 
Targeted 
benefits 
redistribution Social 
insurances 
variable 
 
 
 11
 
 
3. Typology from quantitative data 
 
Beyond the institutional differences on which the above typologies are based, the developed 
countries’ systems of welfare fulfil identical function. They aim at insuring individuals and 
families against the four major generic risks of life, which are: 
 
• Children upbringing, which affects the families’ income level while incomes from 
work do not vary according to the families’ expenditures; 
• Unemployment and poverty resulting from lack of work 
• Illness and handicap; 
• Old age. 
 
Therefore, welfare states always include social advantages for families with children, some 
public unemployment benefit, a system of minimum income for the poor, public protection, 
(more or less extensive), healthcare spending, public pensions, and complementary private 
systems.  
 
What distinguishes systems from one another is related to the extent of the collective systems 
which may cover more or less large fractions of the risks incurred, and the modalities of the 
benefits’ delivery, which may be centralised or decentralised, be given in the shape of 
monetary benefits or as social services in kind, and which may be given by public institutions 
or by private or more or less compulsory company insurances. In order to compare European 
countries and the United States quantitatively, a 7-categories nomenclature of social spending 
can be retained: 
 
• Public monetary benefits in favour of those in employment, including mainly 
unemployment benefits and income support for the poorest; 
• Private monetary benefits for those in employment on top of the latter; 
• Public healthcare benefits, monetary or through services in kind; 
• Public pensions; 
• Private pensions; 
• Service expenditures in kind other than healthcare (which include nursery spending 
among others). 
 
Graphs 1.1 to 1.5 make it possible to visualise the importance and the repartition of welfare 
expenditures among the main Western European countries and in the United States. 
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Graph 1.1. : Welfare expenditure in GDP % in 2001; the Scandinavian model 
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Graph 1.2. : Welfare expenditure in GDP % in 2001; the continental model 
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Graph 1.3. : Welfare expenditure in GDP % in 2001; the American model 
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Graph 1.4. : Welfare expenditure in GDP % in 2001; the Anglo-Dutch model 
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Graph 1.5. : Welfare expenditure in GDP % in 2001; the Euro-Mediterranean model 
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Looking for a typology now resting on the observation of welfare expenditure evidences five 
relatively homogenous “models” which overlap quite accurately the typology resulting from 
institutional observations. However, while the American model can easily be paired off with 
the British liberal model, it appears much more isolated when a reference is made to the level 
and the distribution of actual expenditure. 
 
The United States is therefore distinguished from the other models by the very low 
spending―whether public or private―on transfers in favour of those in work. The low level 
of this spending―unemployment benefits, family and housing benefits, transfers to deprived 
adults―, is partly compensated for by “tax” credits such as the earning income tax credit for 
those with a low work income. But it remains that American welfare is hardly oriented 
towards the fight against poverty and that there ensue, as we shall see, much more marked 
inequalities than in Europe, and a much higher level of poverty. 
 
For other countries, it is relatively easy to derive the traditional typology again from welfare 
expenditure data. Scandinavian countries find themselves spontaneously within a model 
characterised by a high level of overall spending and a very high share of social services. The 
“continental” model (Germany, Austria, Belgium, and France) is characterised by an 
important share of pensions spending and, by comparison with Scandinavian countries, a 
small share of social services spending. The Mediterranean model (Spain and Italy) 
constitutes a zone with a low spending level, mostly public and almost restricted to pensions 
and healthcare expenditure. Finally, a “British-Dutch” model emerges, characterised by a high 
level of private pension spending, which brings it closer to the North-American model, but 
which is distinguished from it by to a much more important level of income support for the 
workers.  
 
The institutional organisation of the welfare state and the structure of welfare spending vary 
greatly according to the countries. However, the total amount of net welfare expenditures is 
comprised in a reduced interval which, except for Ireland, a very atypical small country, 
 15
ranges from 18.9 percent of GDP in Spain, to 31.2 percent in France (table 2). This 
comparison of the weight of welfare spending, both public and private, rests on assessing the 
rate of net welfare expenditure divided by GDP ‘at factor cost’. It makes it possible to correct 
the results obtained by comparing untaxed spending levels which are biased, firstly because in 
some countries a significant share of welfare expenditure takes the shape of a tax expenditure 
(such as the American Earning Income Tax Credit) and also because the variable level of 
contribution applied to outgoing benefits is very uneven. A country with a low rate of 
compulsory contributions may therefore give out low untaxed pensions, but whose purchasing 
power may be identical to those of a country with a much higher contribution rate giving out 
more substantial untaxed benefits. Of course, it must be expected then that the redistribution 
of income between the highest and the lowest one on the scale will be lower in the countries 
with a low contribution rates. By relating expenditure to the GDP at factor cost (that is to say 
by not taking into account the indirect taxes which put a strain on market prices), the actual 
economic impact of the contributions to be taken from producers in order to finance welfare 
expenditure can be measured. This comparison between the net rates of welfare expenditure 
in GDP reduces the differences between the countries and slightly modifies the hierarchy: 
once taxes are taken into account, Denmark, which is the highest spending country in untaxed 
amount, goes behind France and Germany. As for the United States, it joins the main 
European group: it overtakes Finland and finds itself just behind the Netherlands. 
 
 
Table 2: Welfare expenditure in 2001 in GDP % at factor cost 
 
 Gross public 
expenditure 
Gross private 
expenditure 
Gross total 
expenditure 
Net total 
expenditure 
Austria 29.6 1.8 31.4 24.8 
Belgium 28.0 2.8 30.8 26.3 
Denmark 34.2 1.5 35.7 26.4 
France 33.0 2.3 35.3 31.2 
Finland 28.0 1.3 29.3 22.6 
Germany 30.6 3.9 34.5 30.8 
Italy 28.3 1.7 30.0 25.3 
Ireland 15.3 0.5 15.8 13.9 
Netherlands 24.3 7.1 31.4 25.0 
Spain 21.7 0.3 22.0 18.9 
United Kingdom 25.4 5.1 30.5 27.1 
United States 15.7 9.8 25.5 24.5 
 
Source : OECD. 
 
 
4. A marked connection between poverty and public welfare spending 
 
If private welfare spending is taken into account and the impact of taxes is integrated, the 
United States matches the average of the main European group, with a level of welfare 
expenditure of 24.5 percent GDP, placing them slightly below Denmark but above Finland. 
From this viewpoint, American citizens thus have access to a welfare protection not unlike 
what is to be seen in Europe. It could be inferred from this overall observation that the nature 
of welfare, public or private, universal or category-based, centralised or decentralised, matters 
little. In reality, it appears that despite the convergence of welfare spending rates, important 
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differences remain with respect to the welfare’s eventual impact over income distribution and 
poverty. Therefore the variation of public welfare rates in GDP accounts for more than a third 
of the variation of poverty rates observed in the United States and in a sample of European 
countries (figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Poverty rate and public welfare benefits.  
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Source: OECD and author’s own calculation.  
 
 
With a more specific analysis, the reason for this statistical relation can be identified. It can be 
attributed to the great gaps between the rates of effort towards the workers in all countries. 
This specific welfare spending, which includes unemployment benefits, but also income 
support spending for the poorest, makes up the basis of the redistribution which aims at 
reducing income inequalities and wipe out situations as extreme poverty as much as possible. 
On their own, they account for 63 percent of poverty rates variations in the sample of 
countries previously used (figure 5). The United States is strongly opposed to the core of the 
European countries, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and even more to the 
Scandinavian countries. The “European social model” appears quite characteristic, and in this 
respect it is neatly opposed to the North-American model, through a high level of protection 
for the poorest which restricts poverty significantly. Only the south European countries are 
slightly closer to the United States. But even these countries spend more for the workers and 
consequently have a lower poverty rate. 
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Figure 5. Poverty rates and income support public welfare benefits for the workers 
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5. A share challenge: population ageing 
 
In all western countries, the reform of welfare systems has been on the agenda since at least 
the early nineties. These reforms originate in several factors, the most important of which is 
population ageing. Demographic evolutions, both in Europe and the United States, indeed 
lead necessarily, without any major reform, to an increase of the financial burden linked to 
welfare funding which is heavy on the workers―and will become increasingly so. 
 
Three demographic events lead to ageing: 
 
• The post-WW2 baby-boom (which took place slightly earlier in Germany for obvious 
reasons) constituted a demographic surge whose progress upset long-term 
demographic trends. At first, up to the seventies, it led to an important rejuvenation of 
the population, while impairing the balance between the active and the non-active part 
of the population: the baby boomers did not work yet. Then, from the seventies to the 
noughties, it strongly diminished the ratio between workers and non-workers: the baby 
boomers were in employment, they had fewer children than their parents, and the 
latter, who were gradually leaving work, were far less numerous. This phase was a 
boon for welfare, since pension spending was spontaneously contained, which made it 
possible to improve benefits with relatively weak contributions. Finally, since the 
early eighties, the baby boomers’ transition to retirement age has led to sudden ageing 
and financing welfare benefits is becoming an increasingly heavy financial burden. 
The transition of the baby boom wave has partly reversible consequences: once the 
wave is over, the working/ non-working ratio should return to its structural level 
which depends on average life expectancy and birth rate, and which is below the level 
reached during the baby boomers’ retirement period. The degradation of welfare 
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funding structures is therefore partly circumstantial (even if the duration of the ‘cycle’ 
stretches over 30 to 40 years) and may as a result be compensated by a new 
immigration wave which is already well-advanced in the United States. 
 
• The extension of average life expectancy is the second factor of demographic ageing. 
On average, in western countries, life expectancy increases by a term every year. This 
is a structural movement whose end is difficult to forecast because of the great 
uncertainty relative to the asymptote that is the maximum duration of life (120 years?) 
and the difficulty of predicting the evolution of the population’s health, as on the one 
hand it benefits from improved medical treatments and on the other, suffers from 
unfavourable behaviours (cigarette addiction, alcoholism, poor eating habits), or even 
from the degradation of the natural environment. Nonetheless, the evolutions observed 
rather tend to confirm the hypothesis of the continued extension of life expectancy, 
which implies a structural adjustment of welfare. Contrary to the effects of the baby 
boom, which are transitory, this is a lasting constraint which can not be bypassed by 
population movements (immigrants too age, and the duration of their retirement is on 
the increase too). The normal reaction to such ageing through the extension of life 
consists in a proportional extension of the time spent in employment, so as to maintain 
the ratio between the number of those retired and those in work to avoid having to 
increase too much the contributions taken from the workers’ incomes. This balancing 
out is quite natural since, in addition to the fact that the increase of life expectancy 
extends retirement time, the latter tends to improve in quality since it is an increase of 
life expectancy in good health. All the countries have thus implemented reforms which 
incite many people to postpone retirement age. Some, by pushing back minimal ages 
(United States, Germany, United Kingdom), others, by broadening individual freedom 
of choice through a reform guaranteeing the actuarial neutrality of the retirement age 
(Swedish, Italian and French cases) and which, coupled with parameter changes (level 
of the replacement of employment income according to the time spent in 
employment), incites individuals to postpone their departure from working life. 
 
 
• The lowering of the birth rate is the third factor of population ageing. This evolution is 
very negative in Europe, except in Ireland and in France. Like in the United States, the 
birth rate remains close to 2 (1.9 on average from 2000 to 2005 in France and 2.0 in 
the United States), which suggests that there is no risk of a population decrease. The 
situation of the other European countries is especially critical on the contrary, since 
the generations’ renewal is guaranteed nowhere. Two groups can be made out: the first 
one, which includes the United Kingdom, Scandinavia and Benelux, retains an 
average birth rate, between 1.6 and 1.75; the second group, which comprises ex-
Communist Eastern European countries and all of Mediterranean Europe, shows an 
extremely weak birth rate ranging from 1.2 to 1.5 children per woman in child-bearing 
age. Such a low birth rate has delayed effects on demographic balances which are not 
affected yet. But over the next twenty years, its consequences will be disastrous in 
countries like Italy or Spain. The decline of the birth rate will naturally make the 
funding of welfare more problematic eventually, all the more as, just like the increase 
of life expectancy, it cannot be lastingly made up for by immigration. And while the 
correction of this unfavourable evolution certainly implies an increase of the spending 
targeted on families, especially through an increase of the child-minding services on 
offer, the only efficient way of making women’s aspirations to work compatible with 
motherhood, imply more public expenses. 
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As a result of demographic ageing, in the course of the twenty-first century, and from its first 
years, welfare systems in Europe and the United States will all be facing a sharp increase of 
the needs for social transfers with respect to pensions and healthcare. Figure 6 shows the 
evolution of the ratio between population above sixty four and those between fifteen and sixty 
four from 1970 to 2050. It clearly evidences the general character of the demographic 
challenge which concerns all the country, but with a very significant difference between the 
much degraded situation of Mediterranean countries and the less unfavourable evolution of 
the United States. 
 
 
Figure 6: The ratio between the population above 64 and the population from 15 to 64 
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Source : UN population perspectives. 
 
The increasing weight of pension benefits resulting from demographic evolutions may be 
partly contained by the gap between the retirement age and a certain peaking up of 
immigration, but the low European birth rate calls for a raise of healthcare spending. The 
latter, which is general, is especially significant in the United States, partly as a result of the 
absence of any control of medication prices. The projections of healthcare needs are 
uncertain, since the progression of the available therapeutics is hard to predict. However, 
recent-years observations show that the increase of life expectancy in good health and without 
any incapacity also results from the increase of healthcare costs. 
 
If the demographic trends are extended, and by supposing that the average benefits or 
refunding costs remain constant, future needs in terms of welfare in retirement and healthcare 
can be assessed. With a few simple hypotheses about the likely evolutions of spending for 
family and unemployment benefits, the projection of the share of all welfare expenditures in 
GDP can be made more complete (table 3).3 
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Table 3: Spontaneous evolution (i.e. before any reform) of the share of welfare 
expenditure in GDP between 2000 and 2050 
 
 2000 2050  
% of GDP Family Unem-
ployement
Pensions Health-
care 
Total*
(1) 
Family Unem-
ployement
Pensions Health-
care 
Total*
(2) 
Variation 
(2) - (1) 
Germany 3.0% 2.4% 12.0% 10.3% 29.5% 2.3% 1.2% 17.1% 13.6% 36.0% 6.5 
Spain 0.5% 2.4% 9.1% 7.3% 20.1% 0.4% 0.7% 15.7% 10.3% 27.9% 7.8 
France 2.7% 1.9% 12.4% 9.8% 29.7% 2.0% 0.8% 17.2% 12.7% 35.6% 5.9 
Italy 0.9% 0.4% 15.4% 7.5% 25.2% 0.6% 0.2% 22.9% 10.5% 35.2% 10.0 
Netherland 1.2% 1.3% 10.9% 10.6% 27.4% 0.9% 1.3% 16.6% 13.8% 36.0% 8.6 
United 
Kingdom 1.8% 0.8% 12.3% 9.1% 26.8% 1.4% 0.6% 18.6% 11.5% 34.9% 8.1 
Sweden 3.3% 2.0% 11.8% 11.8% 30.9% 2.6% 1.4% 16.4% 14.1% 36.5% 5.6 
USA 0.5% 0.4% 8.9% 13.1% 23.5% 0.4% 0.5% 12.8% 16.5% 30.8% 7.3 
Source : OFCE calculations for the French “conseil d’orientation des retraites”. 
 
All the European countries4 and the United States thus have to face strongly growing welfare 
needs. The differences in the demographic configurations play a relatively small part when 
the examination focuses only on the question of needs’ pressure. Therefore, the fact that the 
United States retains a higher birth rate and that the ratio between the elderly non-workers and 
the workers is not degrading as much as it is in Europe does not lead to a much more 
favourable relative situation. Many European countries, and particularly France, can indeed 
make up for the increasing pensions and healthcare funding needs through a decrease of 
unemployment and family spending, while the United States already has full employment, 
fewer advanced retirement and family benefits, and therefore affords little leeway. It must be 
added that the funding needs of welfare depend little on the functioning of pension schemes. 
Thus, American companies’ defined-contribution schemes have to deal with an insufficient 
provisioning which has already reached $850 billion, which will entail the intervention of the 
federal organism’s pension guarantee and imply an increase of direct and added taxes. 
Similarly, the British pension reform is called into question by the lack of voluntary 
contributions, which is likely to lead to an increase of compulsory contributions. In the 
countries which have implemented mechanisms of automatic stabilisation of pay as you go 
pension systems modelled on individual notional accounts (Sweden and Italy in particular),5 
pension schemes may give out only very low pensions (especially in Italy, due to a very 
degraded demography), unless, as in some countries, the balance is re-established through an 
increase of contributions. 
 
In the end, the current pension reforms have shared characteristics. Whereas, in the eighties, 
the debate focused on systemic solutions to the population ageing challenge (partial 
privatisation of welfare and pensions, substitution of funding for repartition), it seems that a 
parametric arbitration is increasingly favoured: the point is to find out, today, while the baby 
boomers are drawing near retirement age, how to distribute the effort of financial adjustment 
between the age of retirement, the average pensions level, and the contribution level. The 
political debate on this question remains confused because the liberals have not relinquished 
the perspective of a systemic reform, especially in the United States. But it is now too late to 
apply it to the baby boomers, so that the solution will undoubtedly imply, at least partly, an 
increase of welfare contributions. This seems all the more likely as the funding needs of 
healthcare systems will probably not be contained over the next years. The impact of 
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population ageing and the increasing treatment costs will combine to increase the pressure 
while in this sector the prospect of an efficient systemic reform is unlikely. Northern 
European countries may have achieved significant results over the past few years, but the 
American example of the HMO6 shows that the effects of the rationalisation of healthcare 
provision are transitory and that, once they have been obtained, spending increases more 
quickly than incomes do.  
 
How will the various European countries and the United States respond to this situation―all 
the more as welfare contribution levels are already high, and the dominant trend points 
towards liberalisation, the reduction of the state’s involvement, and competition between the 
nations and social systems? It is obviously very difficult to picture an opinion change today in 
favour of an extension of welfare provision. However, a strong resistance in public opinions 
against any substantial cut in public pensions and healthcare is also manifest. In the United 
States, it is therefore unlikely that the contemplated public pension reform which should lead 
to account individualisation will see the light. Similarly, the British could quickly move 
towards a strengthening of the obligatory pillar of the pension system after having widely 
individualised the system in the eighties. In France, as in Germany, the option for a 
parametric reform already forecasts a rise of contributions. In Italy, the transition to notional 
accounts is very slow and a contribution increase is certainly unavoidable. For now, no 
country seems able to take on the risks associated with a brutal reform without a contribution 
increase, which would lead to a massive impoverishment of pensioners in some countries 
(Italy), and a significant one in all the others. The fact that all the countries are confronted 
with the same challenges almost at the same time makes it possible to contemplate a balanced 
reaction: a combination of parametric pension reforms and care efficiency improvement could 
limit, without cancelling it altogether, the necessary contribution increase. It is certainly 
possible, by lengthening the working life, resorting to immigration and rationalising 
healthcare systems, to cut by half the funding needs presented in table 3. As a result, the 
progressive increase of social contributions, if it is also accompanied by a rationalisation of 
other public spending, becomes absolutely likely. The neo-liberal present could give way, 
under the pressure of needs, to a new extension of the Welfare State. The United States, a 
homogenous power protected by a strong and flexible currency, could deal with it easily 
enough. In Europe, the difficulty is no doubt much greater, because of the weakness of the 
institutions which weigh down the efficiency of economic policy and may lead the states to 
play on tax rate competition and, eventually, on social competition, to re-establish their 
economic and financial balances. This could lead to a paradox: because they fail to coordinate 
efficiently, the European states could yet, through competition, destroy the social balances 
which they are all trying to reach. The cost of this “non Europe” could thus become 
exorbitant. Fortunately, there exists a more favourable scenario in which the shared 
constraints linked to population ageing and the attachment to the welfare systems’ solidaristic 
values lead to balanced reforms. Which of these two scenarios will prevail? The arguments in 
favour of one or the other’s success seem to balance out nowadays. The next few years will be 
crucial for Europe. More than ever, institutional reform is a sine qua non to enable the debate 
to develop clearly.  
 
 
* 
** 
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Comparing welfare systems on both sides of the Atlantic shows that while solutions differ, the 
problems to be solved are widely shared: population ageing is a major challenge everywhere. 
The growth of inequalities made worse by globalisation and bitter competition imply greater 
income redistribution everywhere. The growth of age-related healthcare spending, but also, 
and above all, the improved medical techniques, increase mutualisation needs everywhere. 
Overall, these evolutions all imply an increase in welfare spending in a context of tensions 
over public spending linked to reluctance to taxes and the search for competitive labour costs. 
Over the last decade, new solutions have emerged, which mix a hidden rise of contributions 
through the privatisation of part of welfare protection (such as the increase of the healthcare 
funding by private insurances or the reduction of public pension systems and incentives to 
individual pension benefits), the refocusing of social transfers on the most deprived parts of 
the population, often paired with the activation of passive spending (work incentives). These 
measures, which translate in fine into a cut in welfare, do not avoid the increase of 
compulsory or voluntary contributions linked to the growth of welfare needs. On the one 
hand, these measures appear to be justified above all by the various notions in each country of 
the place of the state, rather than by the necessities of improving the systems’ efficiency. In 
this debate, the United States seems quite far from Europe, while public opinion there is much 
more receptive to the liberal theses than European opinion (see Chapter 7 on values, and the 
concluding chapter). But beyond ideology, welfare systems prove enduring, and they should 
not regress, whether in the United States or in Europe, because they appear indispensable in 
modern societies. In this respect, the promotion of the Scandinavian flexi-security model 
(which in reality is restricted to Denmark), which mingles economic liberalism and a strong 
individual protection against social and economic risks, only reemphasises the original 
mission assigned to welfare protection: enabling the market economy to function while 
warranting the citizens’ welfare.  
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Notes 
 
1. The term of covariation of employment and wages is of secondary importance and can be omitted. The term 
which can be attributed to taxes is weak in all the countries and does not modify the conclusions of this general 
analysis. It was therefore left aside to avoid weighing down this presentation. Another solution consisted in 
reasoning at ‘factor cost’, that is to say, from the evaluation of added value without taxes. 
 
2. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 
3. These projections were carried out by the OFCE in 2004, for the Conseil français d’orientation des retraites. 
They rest on the following hypotheses: for pensions, the actual age when work is topped is maintained at the 
level reached in 2000 and the average pension allowance evolves like the average net salary; for healthcare, 
spending per person evolve like the GDP per head and increase according to population ageing by supposing that 
the ratio of spending per age observed in the early 2000 remains constant; spending for families is indexed on the 
population under 18; lastly, unemployment benefits evolve like unemployment whose rate is supposed to 
converge in the long term towards a uniform 5% level.  
 
4. The spending projections were carried out only for the large European countries and the United States, but the 
orientation of demographic evolutions is identical in the other countries, so that the conclusions can be 
generalised to all the countries.  
 
5. Individual notional accounts simulate the functioning of a defined-contribution scheme in a defined-benefit 
pension system. Future benefits are not funded but the yielding of the subscriptions inscribed for each working 
individual depends on how the demographic ratio evolves, which ensures that the system remains stable. When 
life expectancy increases, if those in work retain the same retirement age, the amount of their pension benefit 
diminishes.  
 
6. Implementation of integrated care managed by insurers for the benefit of insurers.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
